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Abstract In this paper I present a novel supertask in a Newtonian universe that destroys
and creates infinite masses and energies, showing thereby that we can have infinite
indeterminism. Previous supertasks have managed only to destroy or create finite
masses and energies, thereby giving cases of only finite indeterminism. In the Nothing
from Infinity paradox we will see an infinitude of finite masses and an infinitude of
energy disappear entirely, and do so despite the conservation of energy in all collisions. I
then show how this leads to the Infinity from Nothing paradox, in which we have the
spontaneous eruption of infinite mass and energy out of nothing. I conclude by showing
how our supertask models at least something of an old conundrum, the question of what
happens when the immovable object meets the irresistible force.
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1 Introduction
Since Zeno, supertasks, tasks that involve infinite actions or interactions, have had an
important role as objects of philosophical contemplation. Each encapsulates a vivid and
intriguing challenge to our metaphysical theory.1 Zeno’s paradoxes themselves pose
serious problems for our understanding of space and time and it is thought Zeno
intended them as a proof of monism.2 Achilles and the Tortoise, for example, takes
as a premiss that space and time are infinitely divisible and the putative impossibility of
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Achilles catching up with the tortoise is a reductio of that premiss. The Stadium takes as
a premiss that space and time are finitely divisible and the conclusion that half the time
equals twice the time is a similar reductio. Whether modern analysis3 fully resolves
these challenges has continued to be debated by philosophers.4
More recently we have supertasks such as Benardete’s Paradox of the Gods,
A man decides to walk one mile from A to B. A god waits in readiness to throw
up a wall blocking the man’s further advance when the man has travelled ½ a
mile. A second god (unknown to the first) waits in readiness to throw up a wall of
his own blocking the man’s further advance when the man has travelled ¼ mile.
A third god … etc. ad infinitum. (Benardete 1964, pp. 259-60)
Since for any place after A, a wall would have stopped him reaching it, the traveller
cannot move from A. The gods have kept him still without ever raising a wall. Yet how
could they cause him to stay still without causally interacting with him? Only a wall can
stop him and no wall is ever raised, since for each wall he must reach it for it to be
raised but he would have been stopped at an earlier wall. So he can move from A.5
Supertasks can be set up in Newtonian universes of point particles with classical
dynamics (hereafter, Newtonian universes) in which actual infinities of particles are
permitted but each must have a finite speed.6 So, for example, consider Benardete’s
Spaceship Paradox (1964), in which a space ship doubles its speed in the first ½ hour,
doubles it again in the next ¼ hour and so on. Where has it got to one hour after it
started? Infinitely far from its starting place? But there is no such place. It has gone out
of existence. Yet how can mere increase in speed result in non-existence? Perez
Laraudogoitia (1997) has shown how this can be modelled in a Newtonian universe
by arranging an infinitude of particles to successively collide with a single particle,
doubling its speed on each collision.
Perez-Laraudogoitia also created the Beautiful Supertask within a Newtonian uni-
verse. Since this last was the original inspiration for this paper and we make partial use
of it I shall outline it briefly. In the Beautiful Supertask we have a one dimensional space
in which we take one point to be the reference frame zero and an infinitude of point
particles such that the ith particle is positioned at 1/2i, for all i in the natural numbers (i.e.
at ½, ¼, 1/8…and so on). Approaching from the right is a single particle with velocity
−1. It will collide with the 1st particle and thereby stop, imparting its velocity to the 1st
particle, which in turn will collide with the 2nd particle and thereby stop, imparting its
velocity to the 3rd particle...and so on (1996:81). For every i, within one unit of time
from the first collision, the ith particle has collided with the i + 1th particle and stopped.
Hence after one unit of time all the particles are stationary, thereby showing how
the total initial energy of the system of particles… can disappear by means of an
infinitely denumerable number of elastic collisions, in each one of which the
energy is conserved (1996:82)
3 By which I mean fruit of nineteenth Century mathematics starting with Cauchy.
4 See Salmon 1970; Arntzenius 2000 and Huggett 2010.
5 See discussion Yablo 1993; Priest 1999; Hawthorne 2000; Angel 2001; Shackel 2005
6 For some supertasks being a point particle is not essential, but rather, all particles can have volume provided
their diameters decrease suitably.
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Some people reject altogether the application of classical Newtonian mechanics to
actually infinite systems. Even if they are admitted, one may also raise questions about
the initial conditions that are posited for these supertasks, such as how they could ever
come about, or whether their possibility doesn’t depend on some mysterious creation
by a god. More broadly, for those who are skeptical of metaphysics that is not very
severely disciplined by our current best physics, a position most recently advanced by
Ladyman and Ross (2007), such applications may have no interest.
In response, it may be said that metaphysical possibility is very broad, broader than
mere physical possibility, and broad enough to include Newtonian universes of all
varieties. Granted the possibility of infinite duration for the universes there is little to
object to the initial conditions posited: they are merely the conditions convenient to
start with and the entire history of the universe leading to those conditions could easily
be given if necessary.7 Newtonian supertasks in the literature are of this type. They have
no need of a creator nor instant of creation but are just the possible worlds with a certain
specifiable history that leads to the moment from which we start our explorations. That
being said, there are also possible worlds that have an initial instant8 and such include
Newtonian universes with various distributions of particles at that instant.
These are all issues about Newtonian universes that can be contended but for reasons
of space they are not contended here.9 This paper is in the tradition of previous papers
that have treated such systems on the assumption that exploring the metaphysical
possibilities of Newtonian universes, and in that way testing the metaphysical princi-
ples manifested therein, has philosophical significance.
Previous supertasks in Newtonian universes have managed only to destroy or create
finite masses and energies, thereby giving cases of only finite indeterminism. They
have usually offered only a single argument to their paradoxical conclusions, making
them vulnerable to single rebuttals. In this paper I present a novel supertask that
destroys and creates infinite masses and energies, showing thereby that we can have
infinite indeterminism. In the Nothing from Infinity paradox we will see an infinitude
of finite masses and an infinitude of energy disappear entirely, and do so despite the
conservation of energy in all collisions. Furthermore, the paradox can be based on each
of four different continuity principles and as a result there are four independent
arguments to the paradoxical conclusion. Consequently it raises significant challenges
to the metaphysical principles on which it rests, with a special robustness because there
is no single path to its resolution. I then show how this leads to the Infinity from
Nothing paradox, in which we have the spontaneous eruption of infinite mass and
energy out of nothing. I conclude by showing how our supertask models at least
something of an old conundrum, the question of what happens when the immovable
object meets the irresistible force. This has often been thought to be simply contradic-
tory and therefore a weak paradox, and we shall see a question arises over the exact
relation of our model to the paradox that our ancestors had in mind. Nevertheless, the
fact that a version of it can be given a formal model shows the easy dismissal may be
too quick.
7 That is to say, given initial conditions for t = 0 we can give the state of the universe for all t in (−∞,0].
8 or a greatest lower bound on time, if we want to make sure we include all options.
9 For more discussion, see Earman and Norton 1996; Perez Laraudogoitia 1997; Alper and Bridger 1998;
Alper et al. 2002
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2 The Nothing from Infinity paradox
Our supertask is set in a one-dimensional Newtonian universe without gravity, con-
taining point particles with unit mass. Nothing turns on it being one-dimensional, but
all the action happens in one dimension so it might as well be. Space and time are
continuous and we use a reference frame with a spatial x-axis and a temporal t-axis.
Particles have continuous paths; have inertia, so they continue at uniform velocity
unless and until colliding with another; are impenetrable, so if a particle is on one side
of another it can never reach the other side. Collisions are perfectly elastic so result in
particles exchanging velocities.
We have two countably infinite pluralities of particles, which I shall call the Ms and
the Fs. The Ms are motionless at time t = 0 and at that time, for all n∈ℕ,10 the nth
particle, mn, is positioned at x = 1/n, i.e. m1 is at 1, m2 is at ½, m3 is at 1/3 and so on .
The Fs are in motion at time t = 0 and at that time, for all n∈ℕ\{1}, the nth particle, fn, is
positioned at x = n with velocity vn = −n, i.e. f2 (there is no f1 for notational conve-
nience) is at 2 with velocity − 2, f3 is at 3 with velocity − 3 and so on. We will call the
state of our universe at time t = 0 the initial condition.
I give here a picture that I hope is an aid to the reader. This and the later pictures use
blue forMs and purple for Fs, arrows to represent velocity, and are not to scale (Fig. 1):
2.1 Possibility of the initial condition
Before we turn to what happens after t = 0 let us consider the question of co-existence
of theMs and Fs. TheMs comprise particles in an arrangement similar to the infinity of
stationary particles in Perez Laraudogoitia’s Beautiful Supertask (1996). The Fs com-
prise particles in an arrangement similar to the infinity of moving particles in Perez
Laraudogoitia’s (1997) version of the aforementioned Benardete’s Spaceship Paradox
(1964). So our initial condition is based on well known examples in the literature
investigating puzzling phenomena in classical particle dynamics. Individually, then, the
Ms and Fs are possible. Can they co-exist?
Consider another universe containingMs and F+s where the F+s are exactly like the
Fs except their velocities are positive rather than negative. The Ms and F+s will never
meet and their future is straightforward.11 This shows that there is nothing objectionable
per se about a universe in which an infinitude of stationary particles coexists with an
10 Our natural numbers start at 1.
11 This would be one of the Newtonian universes that have an initial instant. If we are worried about that, so
far as the specific point of interest to us here goes, a two-dimensional beginningless and endless universe could
house the Ms and F+s. We could arrange the F+s two dimensionally on parallel paths away from the Ms: put
the Ms on the x-axis and for all n, the nth particle of the F+s moves on the line y = n. We shall do something
















Fig. 1 The Ms and the Fs
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infinitude of particles in motion nor need such coexistence imply obscurity about the
future of that universe. Granted the cases in the literature, this other universe seems also
possible and that alone proves the possible co-existence of a pair of pluralities like the
Ms and Fs. The mere reversal of velocities cannot make the initial co-existence of the
Ms and Fs impossible when the Ms and F+s are possible.
Finally, we should note that there is nothing special about the initial condition of our
Ms and Fs being initial. It is merely the state of our universe at t = 0 and given that state
we know the prior history of the universe for all t in (−∞, 0]. It just happens to be
convenient to start our exploration at t = 0. So the initial condition is possible.
2.2 What happens when the Ms and Fs meet
The consequence of the initial condition is that the Ms and Fs will undergo a series of
collisions, which for brevity I will call themeeting of theMs andFs.What happens when the
Ms and Fs meet? For a start, less us consider a similar universe consisting of theMs with a
single particle, p, at position x= 2 at time t=−1with velocity v =−1. This results in a chain of
collisions. Particle p hits particle m1 at t= 0 and stops, imparting its velocity of −1 to m1. In
general particlemn hits particlemn+1 at time t= 1–1/(n+ 1) and stops, passing on its velocity.
Consequently for all n, the nth particle will have stopped at time t= 1–1/(n+ 1). So every
particle has stopped at some definite moment before t= 1 so at t= 1 every particle is at rest.
This should seem familiar, since it is a version of the aforementioned Beautiful Supertask.
It will be useful if we can refer to the chain of collisions in the Ms initiated by the
collision of p with m1 as the wave wp. The kth collision in the wave takes place at x = 1/
k and the wave travels at the same velocity as p did before the first impact. BecauseMs
are confined to the interval (0,1] so too is wp. The effect of the wave is for p to take the
original position of particle m1 and in general for particle mn to take the original
position of particle mn+ 1. Although p starts out with a velocity adequate to reach
x = 0 at t = 1, nothing ever reaches x = 0.
When the Ms and Fs meet, the meeting is constituted by an extended series of
collisions. Each fn arrives at x = 1 at t = 1–1/n.
12 So f2 hits particle m1 and stops,
imparting its velocity of −2 to m1. In general at t = 1–1/n each fn hits particle fn-1 and
stops, imparting its velocity of –n to fn-1.
It looks as if the collisions constituting the meeting of the Ms and Fs are very
complex, since each particle will be struck infinitely often by the particle to its right and
will then move until it strikes the particle to its left. In fact we can see what is going on
by considering the waves of collisions that constitute the meeting of the Ms and Fs.
The wavewn is the chain of collisions started by the impact of fn at x = 1 at t = 1–1/n.
13
It may appear that one wave can catch another, i.e. that collisions in wn and wm might
happen at the same time and place but I have arranged for that not to be possible. Since
the wave travels with the velocity of its initiating particle vn = −n the position of the
wave wn is wn(t) = n(1-t). So coincidence would require a time t such that n(1-t) =m(1-t)
which can only occur if t = 1 or n =m. What this means is that if collisions in wn and wm
coincide for t < 1 then wn is wm.
12 From position of fn given by xn(t) = n-nt.
13 For example, w2 (there is no w1) starts at particle m1 at t = 1/2, reaches particle m2 at t = 3/4, particle m3 at
t = 5/6 and in general reaches particle mn at t = (2n-1)/2n.
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What happens at t = 1 is going to require some discussion. At t = 1, wn(t) = 0. It is
worth noting that there is no particle at x = 0 with which to have a collision. Wave wn
has its first collision with m1 at x = 1/(n-1), after which its remaining collisions all occur
within theMs. Since theMs are constituted by a sequence of particles with order typeω
and every wave passes through the Ms before ceasing to be, no wave can have a final
collision. Since we know the waves do not catch up prior to t = 1 we also know that all
the waves have their kth collision at x = 1/k. Consequently the waves are confined to the
interval (0,1] and so do not exist at time t = 1.
We haven’t got to the bottom of what happens at t = 1 yet. Intuitively it may look as if all
the particles have to be at x = 0 at t = 1 and it may be unclear what to make of the case.
Certainly it is easy to construct a proof that if the particles are anywhere at t = 1, then they
are at x = 0. But we cannot simply assume that the particlesmust be somewhere, i.e. assume
that they cannot go out of existence. I am now going to show how, at least in the general
case, this is misleading, thereby showing that the mere coincidence of infinitely many
particles may not be an essential feature of the puzzle that theMs and Fs meeting sets us.
What gives rise to the apparent problem at t = 1 is that for the heuristic benefits of
mathematical simplicity I arranged the velocities of the Fs so that they all (in the
absence of theMs) would arrive at x = 0 at t = 1. Since each wave wn has the velocity of
its initiating particle, this is why each wave would arrive at x = 0 at t = 1. If I have made
the general pattern of the case clear you can see that at the cost of more complicated
equations of motion I could have arranged the coincidence of the Fs (in the absence of
theMs) to occur at, say, x = −10, that is to say, at a place well displaced from the whole
meeting of the Ms and Fs. So in that case there would be no temptation to think some
part of the meeting was constituted by all the waves of collisions catching up at the
same time and place since clearly they would have gone out of existence well to the
right of where their equations of motion are equal.
So now having got clear of the essential features of the case and the way in which
the meeting of the Ms and Fs can be understood in terms of thinking about infinitely
many waves of collisions which cannot catch up with each other, we can leave behind
mere mathematical detail.
Since waves do not catch up we can see that a universe consisting of an initial
segment of the Fs, Fs|n,
14 meetingMs would be like an n-fold repetition of the Beautiful
Supertask.15 There is no obvious fallacy of composition involved in taking an n-fold
repetition to have the same outcome as the Beautiful Supertask. At t = 1 the originalMs
now occupy (0,1/(n + 1)] and the Ms have absorbed the n particles of the Fs|n and
nothing ever reaches x = 0.
If we assume that no fallacy of composition is involved in taking the meeting of the
Ms and Fs to be constituted by an infinite repetition of the Beautiful Supertask then
nothing gets to x = 0 and the entire infinite energy of the Fs has been absorbed by the
Ms. Can this be right?
If we can assume a continuity principle, then the meeting of theMs and Fs is the limit
as n tends to infinity of the Fs|n meeting the Ms. In general continuity is a matter of the
14 The initial segment, Fs|n, consists in the plurality of particles f2, f3,…., fn, fn +1.
15 A complication here is that after the first, some waves are preceding through theMs so the particles internal
to the Ms are not all stationary at the moment of the next collision at x = 1 as in the original supertask, but
because the waves never catch up with each other I think it is evident that this does not alter anything essential
so I shall disregard this complication.
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outcome being determined by nearby outcomes whereas discontinuity allows an out-
come to be nothing like nearby outcomes.16 Here the nearby outcomes to the meeting of
the Ms and Fs are the meetings of the Fs|n and Ms. If we take it that these nearby
outcomes determine the outcome of the meeting of theMs and Fs, so that it is the same
as the limit as n→∞ of the meetings of the Fs|n andMs, then we are making a continuity
assumption about the relation of the meeting of theMs and Fs to the meetings of the Fs|n
andMs. So we assume the universe under consideration and nearby possible worlds are
continuous in this way. (A similar argument can be formulated in terms of a within-
world continuity principle instead.17) Each composition of Fs|n and Ms is in a separate
world and we are making a topological assumption about the structure of possible
worlds, that nearby worlds are similar to one another in a special way that grounds the
continuity assumption about the relation of the world containing theMs and Fs and the
nearby worlds of Fs|n andMs. Since for all nearby worlds no particle is at x = 0 at t = 0,
for any particle to be at x = 0 at t = 1 in our universe would be a discontinuity and that is
ruled out by continuity. Hence for our universe, there is no particle is at x = 0 at t = 0.18
We can now prove that there is no position at which any of the Ms can be. First,
nothing gets to 0 so they can’t be there nor, therefore, further left by the fact of
continuous paths for particles. Second, the Ms are confined to the limit as n tends to
infinity of (0,1/(n + 1)] = the open interval (0, 0) = the empty set, so there is no point in
the space at which they can be. To labour the point, since the Ms are confined to the
limit as n tends to infinity of (0,1/(n + 1)], for any x > 0 there is an n∈ℕ such that 1/(n +
1) < x and so no constituent of the Ms can be at x. To have proved that there is no
position at which any Ms can be appears to be sufficient proof that the Ms have gone
out of existence. If there is some doubt we may appeal to Alper et al.’s principle:
(P5) A particle Pi has disappeared by time t* if for any position a, the assertion xi
(t*) = a leads to a contradiction. (Alper et al. 2002:175)
Since we have proved that for t = 1, for all mi in the Ms and for all x in ℝ, mi is not at x,
asserting thatmi is at x leads to a contradiction and hencemi has gone out of existence.
1920
16 See, for example, Sutherland 1998:45 and recall that an open set of a topology is a neighbourhood of the
points it contains. The definition amounts to: when all the neighbourhoods of a point are a certain way then,
given continuity, it will be that way at that point.
17 For example, for a two-dimensional world, placing the Ms and Fs on the x-axis and then for all n placing
correlate copies of Ms and Fs|n on the line y = 1/n.
18 A mistake would be to think this continuity principle implies there has to be a particle at x = 0 at t = 1
because there are particles arbitrarily close to x = 0 prior to t = 1. If that were right then it would apply to the
original Beautiful Supertask and mean that the initial condition would have to include a particle at zero, which
could then be proved to carry off the otherwise vanished momentum. I’m not denying that this resolution may
be worth exploring but no one has ever proposed that the Beautiful Supertask is resolved in this way and I am
working within the same paradigm. Furthermore, if this resolution is allowed then it also rules out Benacerraf’s
Paradox of the Gods, which similarly requires walls at all positions x = 1/n but none at x = 0.
19 One might think that by the same strategy (appealing to a principle of continuity), because in the finite case
no particle disappears, at the limit no particle disappears. That would create an interesting antimony with the
argument just given were it correct. Particles, however, have to be located whereas we have just proved that
the set of points where they can be located is empty.
20 It would also be an error to think that the particles could all coincide at x = 0. We showed in the previous
paragraph that continuity rules out any particle reaching zero. See below for more on when this continuity
assumption is relaxed. In particular, the ‘average velocity’ argument below allows the particles to coincide at x = 0.
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What has happened to the Fs? Consider first a universe consisting of Fs|n + k,
meeting Ms. The situation at the time the nth constituent21 of Fs|n + k reaches x = 1
and stops, awaiting being struck in turn by the next of the Fs is when we are now ready
for the n + 1th repetition of the Beautiful Supertask, with the particles in the interval
(0,1] consisting of the particles in the Ms followed by f2, f3,…., fn, fn + 1: call them the
M*s (Fig. 2).
So the forthcoming k-fold repetition of the supertask that starts from here will, by t =
1, compress theM*s to the interval (0,1/(k + 1)]. So in the limit as k tends to infinity, by
the argument just applied for theMs we can prove for each n that the first n constituents
of the Fs have gone out of existence. And this argument applies for any n so we have
proved that at t = 1 all the Fs have gone out of existence as well.
I cannot think of a simple reason why we are committing a fallacy of composition in
the infinite case and I can think of a case which in which theMs and Fs meet where the
suspicion doesn’t arise. Consider now a two-dimensional universe where each particle
in theMs has initial x and y coordinates equal to the x coordinate in the original case. So
m1 is at (1,1),m2 is at (½,½) and in generalmn is at (1/n,1/n). Each particle of the Fs has
velocities as before and we arrange initial coordinates to match them individually with
the constituents of the Ms thus: f2 is at (2,1), f3 is at (3, ½) and in general fn at (n, 1/(n-
1)) (Fig. 3).
Now m1 and f2 exchange velocities at t = 1/2 and in general mn-1 and fn exchange
velocities at t = 1–1/n(n-1). What happens to the Ms and Fs is the composition of these
infinitely many exchanges and the upshot is that theMs and Fs have changed roles: the
Fs are now a stationary plurality and the Ms are a plurality in motion (Fig. 4).
This is plainly a case in which continuity holds, since what happens to theMs and Fs
just is what happens at the limit of the interactions of the Fs|n andMs. Furthermore, that
continuity holds here supports our assumption that it holds for our supertask.
We needed the continuity assumption to conduct the critical parts of the immediately
foregoing arguments. I cannot think of a simple reason why that assumption may be
false. It seems reasonable but I would concede that it would require further investiga-
tion and defence. We shall now consider some lines of analysis that do not depend on it.
If we give up the assumption of continuity but retain the assumption that the meeting
of the Ms and Fs is constituted by an infinite repetition of the Beautiful Supertask then
we have another argument for the inexistence of the Ms and Fs from the paths of
particles being continuous. For any x > 0 we can prove for each particle there is a time
< 1 for which it is to the left of x and since all velocities are to the left and paths are
continuous, for t > 1 no particle is at x > 0. It would be arbitrary to assume that what is
constituted of an infinite repetition of the Beautiful Supertask could achieve what no
individual or finite repetitions can.22 So nothing passes through x = 0. Since they all
started to the right of zero and particles have continuous paths, they can’t be positioned
to the left of zero without passing through 0. So no constituent of theMs and Fs can be
anywhere for t > 1 so the Ms and Fs no longer exist.
21 Our notational convention for the Fs means that Fs|n + k consists of f2, f3,…, fn, fn + 1,… fn + k, fn + k + 1, and so
the nth constituent of Fs|n + k is fn + 1.
22 Certainly the burden is on anyone who says otherwise to explain why and how the mere repetition of
however many Beautiful Supertasks makes the difference.
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If we give up the assumption of infinite constitution the proof that no particle can be
at any x > 0 at t = 1 still holds.We can also prove that for each particle x = 0 is the limit of
their path at t = 1 and if they still exist, given continuous paths they would coalesce at



















































Fig. 2 Partial meeting for n = 3
Euro Jnl Phil Sci
collision. However, if we consider the average velocity23 of each particle over intervals
of time bounded by t = 1 above and take the limit, it is unbounded below.24 This amounts
to a different appeal to continuity: not that the meeting of Fs and Ms is the limit as n
tends to infinity of Fs|n meeting Ms, but only that the velocity of each particle at an
instant is the limiting average velocity. Taking the velocity of a particle at an instant to be
the limiting average velocity is the definition of instantaneous velocity. If the particles
exist at t = 1 they have an instantaneous velocity, which, by the definition of instanta-
neous velocity is the limiting average velocity, and so they all simultaneously reach
universe escape velocity at t = 1, which amounts to going out of existence for all t > 1.
There is a way to raise a doubt for our case. We might worry about an apparent
conflict between the sequence of average velocities being unbounded and the sequence
of velocities from the starts and stops of each particle, which sequence is divergent by
alternation as opposed to being unbounded.
In fact, this brings into view two further arguments for non-existence. First, we assume
that the alternating sequence is among the proper ones determining the limiting average
velocity.We then have two conflicting sequences resulting in the instantaneous velocity at
t = 1 of the particles being indeterminate, which is incompatible with their existence. Also
we find here an analogy to Thompson’s lamp (Thomson 1954:5) in which a lamp is
alternately switched on and off at times t = 1/n for all n. Is the light on or off at t = 1?
It cannot be on, because I did not ever turn it on without at once turning it off. It
cannot be off, because I did in the first place turn it on, and thereafter I never
turned it off without at once turning it on. But the lamp must be either on or off.
This is a contradiction. (Thomson 1954:5)
Each of the infinitely many particles in theMs are started and stopped, and those in the
Fs are stopped and started, infinitely many times prior to t = 1. Assuming they exist at
t = 1 gives us the analogous contradiction. So we have another paradox here that is
interesting in its own right.
There is widespread agreement that Thompson’s original argument is invalid because
it falsely assumes that the alternating ‘ons’ and ‘offs’ prior to t = 1 sets the state of the
lamp at t = 1 (Benacerraf 1962; Thomson 1970). The import of Benacerraf’s point for us
is that just as the sequence of ons and offs need not determine what happens at the limit
for the lamp, so the mere fact of a sequence of stops and starts need not do so either and
hence neither need the sequence of ‘oscillating velocities’ of those stops and starts. That
is to say, the fact that the sequence of oscillating velocities does not itself converge does
not mean that that failure to converge determines what the velocity is at t = 1. What we
cannot ignore about the sequence of oscillating velocities is that, whilst they oscillate,
they oscillate over ever shorter periods of time and so we can perfectly well consider the
average velocity of particles during intervals that include such oscillations.
So our dialectic here is one of a dilemma. Either the oscillating velocities from the infinite
sequence of starts and stops matter, in which case we have two further arguments for non-
existence. Alternatively, the Benacerraf reply to Thompson shows the oscillating velocities
23 i.e. v =δx/δt
24 i.e. for small ε>0 let ti = 1–ε, tj = 1–2ε then δt = ti − tj =ε, δx = x(ti)–x(tj) and the limit as ε→0 of v = −∞.
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from the infinite sequence of starts and stops don’t matter, in which case the limit of the
average velocities shows non-existence.
We have now seen a variety of arguments to the effect that one unit of time after
meeting, the Ms and the Fs all go out of existence. I do not say the arguments are
conclusive since each depended on reasonable continuity principles that could never-
theless bear further examination. I have used four distinct continuity principles, the
within-world principle, the across-worlds principle, the continuous paths principle and
the instantaneous velocity principle; two of these (paths and velocity) are not really up
for rejection, but there is room for debate on the other two. Nevertheless, each argument
for disappearance based on a continuity principle is independent from the arguments
based on the others so we have four independent arguments for disappearance and
therefore four independent arguments for the Nothing from Infinity paradox. I shall now
finish by drawing out their significance for indeterminism in classical particle mechan-
ics. For it seems to me that our case gives us the most extreme example seen to date.
3 The Infinity from Nothing paradox
The laws of classical Newtonian mechanics are temporally symmetrical. 25 Perez
Laraudogoitia pointed out the temporal inversion of the Beautiful Supertask amounted
to a spontaneous self-excitation and resultant emission of a particle, giving us an
important and elegant example of ‘the problem of indeterminism in classical particle
mechanics’ (1996:83). In the Spaceship case temporal inversion results in the appear-
ance from nowhere of a decelerating Spaceship.
These latter are cases in which finite objects disappear or are absorbed, so in temporal
inversion something of finite mass and energy appears from nowhere, or is emitted from
some particles. We however, don’t have a spaceship or a particle disappearing: we have
an infinity of particles with infinite energy disappearing. So in the temporal inversion we
have infinitely many particles instantaneously coming into existence and arranging
themselves into a stationary and a moving plurality by one second later. It could hardly
be a more extreme case of indeterminism: we have the spontaneous eruption of infinite
mass and energy out of nothing. This is the Infinity from Nothing paradox.
4 The paradox of the Immovable Object meeting the Irresistible Force
No object can resist an irresistible force. No force can move an immovable object. So if
an immovable object meets an irresistible force it will move and not move.26 The
25 Temporal symmetry of laws is when the laws remain the same under the transformation that maps time t to −t.
Classical mechanics (at least in the absence of non-conservative forces) is widely taken to be temporally symmetric.
For an analysis of and challenge to the extent of classical mechanics for which this is true see Hutchison 1993.
26 I have not been able to trace the origins of this paradox. It is effectively an atheistic version of the paradox
of whether an omnipotent God can create a stone he cannot lift. Aquinas answers these difficulties by arguing
(Aquinas 2006: Ia, 25, 3) that God’s omnipotence is not disproved by inability to do what is logically
contradictory. It’s origin is likely to be much older than medieval, however, since a related paradox of the all
penetrating spear and the impenetrable shield was published by the Chinese philosopher Han Feizi around
250 BC (which is apparently why the Chinese ideogram for contradiction consists of the ideogram for spear
next to the ideogram for shield).
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premisses seem to be necessary truths. Does this mean ‘it is impossible for an
irresistible force to meet an immovable objects’, or that ‘it is contradictory to
say they co-exist’ (Sorensen 1992:154)? Maybe not! Admittedly, the ancient
and medieval concepts in terms of which this paradox was originally formulat-
ed are perhaps obscure; they are at least grounded in views we now find
potentially dubious, such as the idea of absolute rest or forces as being in
some sense the possession of bodies.27 So I do not wish to claim that what I
am about to offer is in any straightforward sense capturing what concerned our
ancestors. Nevertheless, given plausible interpretations of what immovability
and irresistibility might mean for Newtonian universes, we can model their
meeting in our supertask. The result is not a mere whimsy even if it is
somewhat whimsical. It offers us a more fine grained view of the immovable
meeting the irresistible, relates interestingly to a traditional view of the paradox
and perhaps advances a new challenge to the metaphysical assumptions in play.
There is no difficulty in the notion of ‘an immovable object’: it is simply the concept
of a physical object that cannot be moved, namely, that cannot have different positions
at different times. The notion of ‘an irresistible force’ is not so clear. Certainly, the
paradox can be understood in terms of the standard scientific concept of force, that is to
say, the concept of a vector with scalar magnitude having the dimensions of
Mass×Length÷Time squared.28 Does the paradox does require us to understand it in
that way? I think not. We should bear in mind Jammer’s point:
in the prescientific stage…. Bforce,^ Bstrength,^ Beffort,^ Bpower,^ and Bwork^
were synonymous, as they still are today in ordinary unsophisticated language.
(Jammer 1957:17)
We should also bear in mind that understanding of the paradox which places it among
the paradoxes of omnipotence. For example, we have Sorensen’s embedding this
paradox in his argument against polytheism
However, if there were two omnipotent beings and they were to have a shoving
match, an irresistible force would meet an immovable object. (For one would
have the power to move anything and the other would have the power to resist
any movement.) (Sorensen 1992:153–4)
We can countenance these points by taking off from an earlier remark of Jammer:
As to the concept of force, taken originally in analogy to human will power,
spiritual influence, or muscular effort, the concept became projected into inani-
mate objects as a power dwelling in physical things. (Jammer 1957:7)
27 My thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
28 Although note that on the scientific concept, force is not something with which one can meet but is rather
something that acts on one, possibly as a result of meeting with something of a kind that can be met with. So
speaking of the immovable object meeting the irresistible force is not in any straightforward sense deploying
the scientific sense of ‘force’. Admittedly this point depends on formulating the paradox in terms of a meeting,
but this is how it is usually put (see, for example, the quotation from Sorensen below).
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I would suggest that in the paradox ‘force’ should be understood to stand for a
wide class of powers ‘dwelling in physical things’ that can somehow or other
bring about motion, where here the concept of power is the metaphysician’s
one. Then, what is meant by ‘an irresistible force’ is a power had by an object,
when that object interacts with another object in the way suitable for that
power to bring about motion, to overcome any resistance to motion, however
great, that the second object may offer. In these terms, an irresistible force is
really an irresistible power.
So I think the paradox hopes to pose a more general problem than merely one
that arises solely in terms of the scientific concept of force, the problem of the
conflict between an immovable object and any irresistible power to cause motion.
One variety of the paradox would be given in terms of the scientific concept of
force, and perhaps all when spelt out scientifically would entail the exertion of
irresistible force (scientifically understood) in the causal chain, but others may be
given in other terms.
Under this interpretation, the paradox as originally presented and as standardly
promulgated deploys the informal concept of force which, when analysed, amounts
to a power of an object to bring about the motion of another object. The meeting of an
immovable object and an irresistible force is then the occasion of the exercise or
manifestation of that power on an immovable object.
This interpretation seems essentially correct to me but I can see that some might
think it amounts to substituting the paradox of the immovable object meeting the
irresistible power to cause motion for the original paradox. Supposing that objection
to be correct, it is still evident that any irresistible power to cause motion entails, when
manifested, an irresistible force and hence any paradox of the immovable object
meeting the irresistible power to cause motion has embedded in it the paradox of the
immovable object meeting the irresistible force (this is essentially the embedding that
Sorensen exploits above). Consequently, I take it that if I exhibit a model of the paradox
of an immovable object meeting an irresistible power to cause motion I have, if only
implicitly, exhibited a model of the paradox of the immovable object meeting the
irresistible force.
For these reasons, then, I think I am free to embed, ground or originate an irresistible
force, in scientific terms, in something that suits our universe and captures the basic
idea of an irresistible power to cause motion. Something that has that power will
manifest its power in part by exerting force but it itself need not be a force. In the
encounter with something with this power one will be subjected to an irresistible force
in the standard scientific sense of force. So when I locate the irresistible power to cause
motion as a power dwelling in an object having infinite momentum or infinite energy, I
have not changed the subject. Whenever we need to we can return to distinguishing the
object as the possessor of the power, the power itself and the irresistible force as what is
manifested by it in the interaction of the possessor with other objects.
In a Newtonian universe, since any force, however small, can accelerate any finite
mass, however large, an immovable object must have infinite mass. In point particle
collision dynamics, the only dynamics of our universe, force is exerted by the changes
of momentum in particles that collide. Such collisions result in instantaneous changes
of momentum but instantaneous changes in momentum entail infinite forces. Force
applied over a distance does work, which is energy, thereby changing momentum. In
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instantaneous collisions the energy transmitted remains finite but the distance is zero so
the force goes to infinity.29 Hence we can’t take an irresistible force to be simply an
infinite force. For when a particle collides with an infinitely massive object, even
though it exerts an infinite force the object does not move (since that would require the
transmission of infinite energy, which the particle does not have) and so an infinite
force can be resisted. Instead of dealing directly with forces we can deal with them
indirectly, avoiding awkward and potentially misleading infinities, by considering the
carriers and effects of force in the universe, namely momentum and changes in
momentum, or alternatively, energies and changes in energies. In our universe the
power to overcome any resistance to motion is not merely an infinite force such as that
which manifests in any instantaneous collision, but is the power of an object with
infinite momentum or infinite kinetic energy. The irresistible force is what is manifested
by such an object when encountering other objects and is what those objects are
subjected to as a result of the encounter.
With these thoughts in mind, and granted a mereological fusion principle that for a
plurality of particles there is an object that is their fusion, the model is evident.30 Our
immovable object, IO, is the fusion of the Ms and our possessor of irresistible power
that exerts irresistible force, IF, is the fusion of the Fs.
The main obstacle in the way of accepting this model is the question of whether IO is,
strictly speaking, immovable.31 My suggestion is that although there is a strict notion of
immovability that might rule out IO from being an immovable object on the grounds of
compression, growth and internal motion, there is also a perfectly good notion that permits
them and requires instead displacement of the whole from its location.32 Consequently it is
at least defensible that none of these grounds impugns IO’s immovability.
Consider again the upshot of a one particle collision of p with IO.33 It could be
argued that this shows IO to be movable after all since its original constituents are now
confined to the interval (0,1/2]. Does this compression alone impugn the immovability?
Perhaps not. In general when we are considering whether an object has moved we are
looking for the whole object to be displaced rather than merely compressed. When I
lean against a concrete block it compresses very slightly but we don’t say it has moved.
If we found part of IO outside of the interval it originally occupied that would clearly be
29 A standard way of getting round this problem is the theory of impulsive forces, see e.g. Lunn 1991:Ch. 9.
Impulses are the integral of forces over time and correlate to the change in the momentum. So in this case the
infinite force acting instantly applies a finite impulse. My thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to
clarify this point.
30 The fusion principle is similar to that assumed by Hawthorne in his discussion of Benardete’s Dichotomy
type paradoxes (Hawthorne 2000:626).
31 I am not here defending the immovability of IO in more complex Newtonian universes which have
frictional forces, inelastic collisions or gravity but solely with immovability in our point particle universe.
32 It might be thought that this issue could be resolved in terms of the centre of mass of IO. This raises the
question about where that would be. If it exists it is to the right of zero and to the left of any point greater than
zero (since there is infinite mass to the right of zero and to the left of any point greater than zero). So either it
doesn’t exist or, assuming it does exist, it would have to be located infinitesimally. The latter case would not be
changed by any of the compression, growth or internal motion that IO undergoes and so for IO the centre of
mass criterion for immovability would correspond to what I have called displacement of the whole from its
location. If it doesn’t exist the criterion cannot help us. Note also that the existence of IO does not depend on
the existence of a centre of mass but depends only on our fusion principle. My thanks to an anonymous referee
for raising the need to clarify this issue.
33 i.e. the Beautiful Supertask with our fusion principle applied to the initially stationary particles.
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a case of it moving, but that is not what we have here. So whilst strict immovability
might rule out compression there does seem a perfectly good sense of immovability
that allows compression provided displacement is lacking.
We could reject the claim that IO has been compressed. The argument to compres-
sion must assume that IO cannot acquire new parts but IO is a fusion of the particles,
not a set of particles. Nothing in our fusion principle rules out IO absorbing additional
particles34 and nothing about immovability entails that an immovable object cannot
acquire new parts. Neither mass nor particle number help determine identity conditions
for IO, since both are infinite, so spatial boundary may be the better criterion for
identity.35 In that case and granted that we accept objects can increase by accumulating
new matter IO has absorbed p as a new constituent that occupies the original position of
m1. As a consequence, although its original constituents are confined to (0,1/2], IO
itself has not been compressed.36 The possibility of growth is a central part of our
common-sense mereological beliefs so it is not an unreasonable assumption. What is
required to show IO to be movable is to displace it but, on this assumption, IO has not
been displaced. It is exactly where it was before. Admittedly that assumption faces the
deep and interesting difficulties of the paradox of increase (e.g. see Olson 2006).37
The final ground would be that the motion of the constituents of IO shows it to be
movable. There is a strict notion of immovability that requires not only the object itself
to stay put but also rules out any internal motion. Yet we do not say that the salt crystal
on my desk is moving just because its internal atoms are. We require the salt crystal
itself to move and that requires displacement of the whole, not the jiggling and internal
migration of its parts. So there is a sense of immovability that allows internal motion
provided displacement is lacking.
My earlier defence of the initial condition of the supertask suffices, granted our fusion
principle, to show the possible initial co-existence of IO and IF. This alone proves the
possible co-existence of an immovable object and an irresistible power to cause motion.
The consequence of that initial condition is that IO and IFwill meet and the outcome of
their meeting will depend on the outcome of the meeting of theMs and Fs. Granted the
correctness of the earlier arguments, what happens when IO and IF meet?
We considered first an argument that the Ms absorbed the energy of the Fs. This
would amount to the entire energy grounding the irresistible force being absorbed by the
immovable object, which, if right, would seem to be a triumph for the immovable object.
We can reject this triumph by considering in detail what happened to the Ms under
various continuity assumptions. We proved that there was no place at which any of
them could be and thereby proved they had gone out of existence. Unless IO came to be
composed by something else that would prove IO itself to have gone out of existence,
which would look like a triumph for the irresistible force.
34 Of course, there are fusion principles with criteria of identity that would rule out such absorption but we
want here to consider the possibility of growth.
35 I owe this point to an anonymous referee.
36 Note the similarity to Hilbert’s infinite hotel, that despite being full is always able to accommodate a new
guest in the very same rooms simply by shifting all guests up a room. See Clark 2002:83.
37 Indeed, perhaps one of the arguments against increase is already in view when we ask the question, what
happens to the object that is the fusion of the Ms and p prior to t = 0? If it now becomes one with IO this
contradicts the necessity of identity.
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We can reject that triumph by considering what happened to the Fs. We proved that
they too went out of existence and again, unless IF came to be composed by something
else that would prove that IF went out of existence. Finally, since we proved that all of
the Ms and the Fs went out of existence, there was nothing left for IO or IF to become
composed by, and hence we can conclude the result of the immovable object meeting
the irresistible force is both going out of existence.
What then is the interest of this model? The paradox of the immovable object and
the irresistible force has been generally regarded as a weak paradox (see my definition
Shackel 2008:49), a thin and trivially illusory paradox of omnipotence.38 The contra-
diction I started with is taken to prove that a possible world with one cannot have the
other. Yet I have offered a model in which an immovable object and an irresistible force
coexist and meet. We must grant, of course, that the obscurity of the ancient and
medieval concepts means the exact relation of this model to their paradox is indeter-
minate. Nevertheless, I have shown what the relevant omnipotence concepts could
mean when applied to Newtonian universes. The application of a simple mereological
principle to our supertask gave two objects to which those concepts properly apply. The
formality of the model allowed me to give a variety of precise and independent histories
of their meeting (correlate to the variety and independence of continuity principles
considered in the underlying supertask). Each history confirms one of the standard
thoughts about the paradox, namely that if they coexist their meeting results in
annihilation. So we now have an interpretation of the immovable object meeting the
irresistible force in a Newtonian universe and we know what happens when they meet.
It remains paradoxical because the annihilation of the infinite is absurd on its face.
5 Conclusion
In the Nothing from Infinity paradox we have seen an infinitude of finite masses and an
infinitude of energy disappear entirely, and do so despite the conservation of energy in
all collisions. This was provable with four independent arguments based on four
different continuity principles, two at least of which are not available for rejection.
The other two seem plausibly based on with-in world and between world similarity. So
this paradox will not easily be rebutted. The temporal invertibility of Newtonian
universes then allowed us to show the Infinity from Nothing paradox, in which we
have the spontaneous eruption of infinite mass and energy out of nothing, thereby
bringing into view the most extreme indeterminism for these universes yet demonstrat-
ed. We concluded by showing how a defensible interpretation of the concepts from the
old paradox of the immovable object meeting the irresistible force allowed our
supertask to model that paradox, raising a question over whether something about that
paradox might have been too quickly dismissed.
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38 See Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 2012
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